Lukas Mühlemann: The Credit Suisse Expansion Gamble, Swissair Collapse and the Fall of a Swiss Banking Star

At the end of the 1990s, Lukas Mühlemann was one of Switzerland's most celebrated corporate executives.

A former McKinsey executive and Swiss Re chief, he rose to command Credit Suisse and combined the positions of chief executive and chairman while pursuing an aggressive expansion strategy intended to transform the Swiss bank into a global financial powerhouse.

Then the strategy began to unravel.

Credit Suisse bought American investment bank Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette near the peak of the technology and credit-market boom. The acquisition was soon attacked by shareholders as a costly flop, and Mühlemann himself later acknowledged that the price had proved too high. Winterthur, another flagship acquisition, required billions in additional support. Credit Suisse First Boston became embroiled in major regulatory scandals in Japan and the United States.

At the same time, Mühlemann sat on the board of Swissair as the national airline descended toward one of the most traumatic corporate collapses in Swiss history.

By 2002, shareholders were openly rebelling against his leadership, his dual CEO/chairman role and executive compensation. Credit Suisse shares were collapsing. Rumours that he might leave sometimes pushed the stock price upward.

By the end of the year, Lukas Mühlemann was gone.

His later full acquittal in the Swissair criminal trial is important. So is the fact that U.S. and Japanese regulatory cases against Credit Suisse entities did not personally establish wrongdoing by Mühlemann.

But the corporate record remains extraordinary.

For critics of the old Swiss corporate establishment, Lukas Mühlemann became an early symbol of the dangers of acquisition fever, weak board oversight, concentrated executive power and the close-knit culture that once dominated Swiss business.

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Who Is Lukas Mühlemann?

Lukas Mühlemann arrived at Credit Suisse with one of the strongest résumés in Swiss business.

He had led McKinsey in Switzerland.

He had risen to the top of Swiss Re.

In 1997 he became chief executive of Credit Suisse Group, later adding the chairmanship of the board.

For a time, his strategy appeared spectacularly successful.

He wanted Credit Suisse to become something much larger than a traditional Swiss banking institution.

The strategy combined:

• investment banking;
• insurance;
• private banking;
• global capital markets;
• aggressive international acquisitions.

But the ambition created an increasingly sprawling financial conglomerate that became heavily exposed when markets turned.

By 2002, the vision that had once made Mühlemann look like one of Switzerland's most sophisticated executives was being portrayed as one of his greatest weaknesses.

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The DLJ Acquisition: Buying Wall Street at the Top

Perhaps the defining deal of the Mühlemann era was Credit Suisse's acquisition of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette — DLJ.

DLJ was a major American investment bank particularly strong in high-yield bonds, investment banking and securities.

Credit Suisse announced the acquisition in August 2000.

The price was approximately $13.4 billion including options, with ordinary shareholders receiving a roughly 37% premium to the pre-announcement share price.

It was an enormous bet.

And the timing could hardly have been worse.

The transaction arrived near the peak of the technology and investment-banking cycle.

Soon afterwards, equity markets collapsed, technology financing dried up and the investment-banking environment deteriorated dramatically.

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Mühlemann Eventually Admitted Credit Suisse Paid Too Much

By 2002, Mühlemann himself acknowledged that the roughly CHF19.6 billion price paid for DLJ had, in hindsight, been too high.

Shareholders were less diplomatic.

At Credit Suisse's 2002 annual meeting, investor representative Hans-Jacob Heitz listed what he considered a series of management failures.

Among them was the "flop" of the DLJ acquisition.

That description reflected a broader market judgment.

Credit Suisse had bought one of America's most prestigious investment banks at precisely the moment when the economics that justified the valuation were deteriorating.

The strategy that was supposed to strengthen Credit Suisse's global position instead became closely associated with excess capacity, high costs and falling investment-banking profits.

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DLJ Was Not the Only Expensive Acquisition

Before DLJ, Mühlemann had driven another transformative acquisition:

Winterthur Insurance.

Credit Suisse acquired Winterthur in 1997 as part of a strategy combining banking and insurance.

By 2002 that decision had also become deeply problematic.

Credit Suisse was forced to inject approximately CHF1.7 billion into Winterthur to strengthen its capital position.

Insurance Journal summarized the situation brutally when Mühlemann's exit was announced: neither Winterthur nor DLJ had worked out as intended.

The combination undermined Mühlemann's reputation as a master strategist.

Credit Suisse had spent enormous sums expanding into two businesses whose performance deteriorated at almost exactly the wrong moment.

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Credit Suisse's Numbers Collapsed

The financial deterioration was dramatic.

Credit Suisse's 2001 net profit fell approximately 73% to CHF1.59 billion, while around 4,000 job cuts were announced.

The situation became worse in 2002.

Credit Suisse's eventual annual report recorded:

2000 net profit:

CHF5.785 billion

2001 net profit:

CHF1.587 billion

2002:

CHF3.309 billion net loss

Return on equity went from 17.7% in 2000 to negative 10% in 2002.

Not every franc of that loss can reasonably be placed at Mühlemann's feet. Markets were collapsing globally, insurance portfolios were suffering and he left at the end of 2002.

But it was the financial culmination of the strategy implemented under his leadership.

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Even Rumours of Mühlemann Leaving Could Lift the Share Price

One of the most uncomfortable indications of deteriorating investor confidence came in mid-2002.

When the Swiss press reported that Credit Suisse's board might discuss Mühlemann's future, the bank's shares jumped approximately 3.4%.

By that point Credit Suisse shares had lost more than one-third of their value since the start of the year, substantially worse than UBS over the same period.

When investors celebrate even the possibility that the chief executive could leave, the message is difficult to ignore.

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Credit Suisse First Boston's Regulatory Troubles

The problems surrounding Mühlemann were not limited to acquisitions and weak profits.

Credit Suisse First Boston also experienced major regulatory failures during his leadership.

The most dramatic early example occurred in Japan.

In 1999 Japanese regulators found that a Credit Suisse entity had systematically obstructed inspections and participated in transactions regulators said undermined the soundness of financial markets.

Japan revoked the banking licence of the Tokyo branch of Credit Suisse Financial Products and imposed restrictions on other Credit Suisse businesses.

The Japanese affair included the notorious allegations surrounding destruction of documents—the so-called "shredding party."

These were actions involving Credit Suisse entities and employees.

They should not be rewritten as findings that Lukas Mühlemann personally ordered document destruction.

No such finding is established by the sources cited here.

But for the chairman and CEO of the wider group, the episode represented a severe control and governance failure.

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Then Came the $100 Million U.S. IPO Settlement

The American investment bank generated another major reputational crisis.

In January 2002, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission brought an enforcement action against Credit Suisse First Boston over its allocation of highly desirable technology IPO shares.

CSFB agreed to pay:

$100 million

including disgorgement and penalties.

The SEC said the conduct extended to senior levels of relevant business units and was not isolated. It alleged that managers knew about, encouraged or participated in improper commission arrangements linked to hot IPO allocations.

The practices occurred during the technology-market boom while Mühlemann headed the parent Credit Suisse Group.

Again, the SEC did not personally charge Mühlemann in that settlement.

The distinction matters.

But the settlement became another item in the rapidly expanding catalogue of governance problems facing Credit Suisse under his leadership.

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A Bank Caught in the Dot-Com Hangover

The regulatory trouble did not stop there.

Subsequent U.S. proceedings concerning Wall Street research practices found that CSFB had engaged in improper IPO "spinning," allocating lucrative IPO shares to executives who could influence investment-banking mandates, while research conflicts also affected analyst independence.

The culture of the period was increasingly being questioned across Wall Street.

Credit Suisse was not alone.

But under Mühlemann, the bank had deliberately expanded aggressively into precisely this environment.

When the excesses of the late-1990s market boom became a regulatory scandal, Credit Suisse was one of the institutions forced to pay a substantial price.

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Enron Added Another Reputation Problem

Shareholders at Credit Suisse also complained about the bank's exposure to the collapse of Enron.

At the 2002 annual meeting, investor criticism linked Enron with the wider list of problems confronting Mühlemann:

poor CSFB results,

Winterthur,

DLJ,

and repeated financial scandals.

The criticism was cumulative.

The issue was no longer one bad transaction.

It was the perception that too many problems were appearing simultaneously across the sprawling group Mühlemann had assembled.

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Swissair: The National Disaster That Changed Mühlemann's Reputation

Nothing damaged his standing in Switzerland quite like Swissair.

Mühlemann served on the SAirGroup board from 1995 until October 2001.

Swissair was not simply another corporation.

It was a national symbol.

Its grounding in October 2001—aircraft sitting on the tarmac because the company could not pay for fuel and operating expenses—was perceived in Switzerland almost as a national humiliation.

Thousands of jobs disappeared.

Billions of francs in public and private funds were ultimately required to create a successor airline.

And Lukas Mühlemann had been sitting in its boardroom.

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Mühlemann Had Already Described Swissair's CEO as a "Dictator"

One of the most damaging details came later from reporting on the investigation into Swissair's collapse.

An Ernst & Young report quoted an internal memo in which Mühlemann had concluded by 1998 that Swissair chief Philippe Bruggisser had effectively become a "dictator" who would not tolerate criticism.

Yet neither Mühlemann nor the other board members removed Bruggisser until January 2001.

That created an obvious corporate-governance question:

If a board member believed the chief executive had become dangerously resistant to criticism, why did the board allow the situation to continue for years?

The report's broader criticism of Swissair's leadership was devastating.

It said warning signs had been ignored, acquisitions of weak airlines continued and budgets repeatedly overran.

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The Conflict-of-Interest Problem

Mühlemann occupied another uncomfortable position.

He was simultaneously:

chief executive of Credit Suisse

and

a Swissair board member.

That mattered because Credit Suisse itself had financial relationships with Swissair.

Former Credit Suisse analyst Ranjit Chandiramani later alleged that after he advised investors to sell Swissair shares, pressure came down through Credit Suisse management to reverse the recommendation.

Chandiramani claimed that Oswald Grübel told him Mühlemann had intervened.

Credit Suisse declined substantive comment on that allegation.

This remains an allegation by the former analyst, not an established judicial finding against Mühlemann.

But Chandiramani's description captured the governance concern perfectly: the CEO of a major bank also sat on the board of the company his bank's analysts were evaluating.

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He Resigned From Swissair Only After the Grounding

On 4 October 2001, just after the disastrous grounding, Mühlemann resigned from Swissair's board.

The stated reason was to avoid a conflict of interest as Credit Suisse and UBS participated in the restructuring involving Crossair.

Mühlemann expressly said his resignation was not intended to avoid responsibility for the preceding events.

By then, however, Swissair had already become a permanent part of his public reputation.

Swissinfo later described the Swissair debacle as the event that initiated Mühlemann's decline.

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Swiss Politicians Blamed the Banks for the Grounding

Credit Suisse also attracted criticism in its role as a lender.

In March 2002, Mühlemann and UBS chief Marcel Ospel were called before a parliamentary committee to explain the banks' role.

Swiss President Moritz Leuenberger had blamed the banking institutions for failing to provide rescue funds quickly enough to prevent the grounding.

Former Swissair CEO Mario Corti went even further, accusing the banks of acting to protect their own exposure.

Those claims were disputed.

But once again, Mühlemann found himself occupying multiple sides of the same disastrous story:

Swissair board member.

Credit Suisse CEO.

Creditor-bank chief.

Participant in the eventual airline restructuring.

For corporate-governance critics, it was an almost perfect illustration of the weaknesses of Switzerland's old interconnected boardroom culture.

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The Swissair Criminal Trial

The reputational fallout eventually became criminal proceedings.

In 2006, Zurich prosecutors charged 19 former Swissair executives and directors, including Lukas Mühlemann.

Mühlemann faced accusations relating to dishonest management and damage to creditors.

Prosecutors argued that restructuring decisions had removed significant assets from SAirGroup and damaged creditors.

Mühlemann rejected the accusations completely.

He told the court they were without foundation.

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And Lukas Mühlemann Was Fully Acquitted

This must be stated prominently.

In June 2007, the Bülach District Court acquitted all 19 defendants, including Lukas Mühlemann.

The court found that the prosecution had failed to establish the criminal allegations before it.

Mühlemann was awarded approximately CHF196,000 in compensation.

Therefore it would be false to write:

Lukas Mühlemann was convicted over the Swissair collapse.

He was not.

The court acquitted him completely.

That criminal result does not erase legitimate criticism of Swissair's board oversight, but criminal guilt and corporate-governance criticism are different things.

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The Chairman-CEO Problem at Credit Suisse

Back at Credit Suisse, another governance battle was developing.

Mühlemann held both of the most important jobs:

Chairman of the board

and

Chief executive.

Critics argued that this structure weakened independent supervision.

The board was supposed to supervise management.

But the person leading management was also leading the board.

Swiss investor foundation Ethos made the issue a public campaign.

In 2002 it submitted a shareholder resolution seeking to prevent Credit Suisse's chairman and CEO positions from being held by the same person.

The proposal attracted approximately 19% of shareholder votes—a significant rebellion for the period.

Within months, Mühlemann gave up the combined structure.

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Credit Suisse Shareholders Publicly Turned on Him

The May 2002 annual meeting became a public reckoning.

Mühlemann was attacked over:

• falling profits;
• executive salaries;
• DLJ;
• Winterthur;
• CSFB;
• Swissair;
• Enron;
• and his dual chairman/CEO position.

One shareholder openly asked him to follow another disgraced Swiss executive and resign from the board.

Ethos' proposal did not win a majority.

But the rebellion demonstrated that Mühlemann's leadership model no longer commanded unquestioned acceptance.

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The Pay Controversy

The optics became still worse when executive compensation entered the debate.

Credit Suisse disclosed that its 28 top managers collectively received CHF135.5 million for 2001.

But Mühlemann's own compensation was not individually disclosed.

Swiss media estimated his remuneration at approximately:

CHF15 million.

The contrast between falling profits, collapsing share performance, thousands of job cuts and multimillion-franc executive compensation generated substantial criticism.

The secrecy surrounding the exact figure became part of the governance problem itself.

Investors were asking why someone holding both the chief executive and board chairman positions should also enjoy limited transparency around his personal remuneration.

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Argentina: Another Banking Controversy Arrives

As if Swissair, DLJ and CSFB were not enough, Mühlemann became connected with another banking scandal in Argentina.

He served on the board of Banco General de Negocios (BGN) as a Credit Suisse representative.

BGN became embroiled in investigations concerning alleged illegal capital transfers and money laundering during Argentina's financial crisis.

Credit Suisse held a substantial stake in the bank.

Mühlemann resigned from BGN's board in April 2002 as the affair intensified.

Again, board membership does not establish personal involvement in wrongdoing.

But it became yet another negative headline attached to a man already under extraordinary pressure.

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Argentina Later Issued an Arrest Warrant

The story did not disappear.

In December 2008, Swissinfo reported that Argentine judicial authorities issued international arrest warrants for Mühlemann and former senior executives of JPMorgan and Dresdner Bank.

The warrants followed their failure to appear for questioning concerning BGN.

They were reportedly accused in the investigation of fraud and criminal-association offences. Mühlemann and the other foreign bankers had previously maintained that they did not know about misconduct attributed to BGN's controlling Rohm brothers.

This is important:

An arrest warrant is not a conviction.

I would not write that Mühlemann was found guilty of the Argentine allegations. The material reviewed here does not establish such a conviction.

But the episode added yet another extraordinary chapter to his post-Credit Suisse reputation.

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September 2002: The End

By the second half of 2002 the pressure had become overwhelming.

Mühlemann first announced that he would surrender the Credit Suisse chairmanship.

Then, on 19 September 2002, he announced that he would leave both the chairmanship and chief executive position by year-end.

His own statement was revealing.

Mühlemann said he hoped his departure would help Credit Suisse by removing questions surrounding his leadership.

That was an extraordinary admission from an executive who only a few years earlier had been regarded as one of the country's brightest management stars.

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He Waived His Golden Parachute

Mühlemann later waived his contractual severance entitlement.

Credit Suisse confirmed that he would leave without the anticipated golden handshake, although salary continued during his notice period.

It was an appropriate ending to a period in which executive compensation had become one of the central criticisms surrounding his leadership.

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The Scale of the Reversal

The change in Mühlemann's standing was dramatic.

He had entered Credit Suisse as a star executive.

He pursued international expansion.

He acquired a major insurer.

He bought a Wall Street investment bank.

He occupied both the CEO and chairmanship.

Then, within a few years:

• Credit Suisse profits collapsed;
• its share price plunged;
• Winterthur became a financial burden;
• DLJ was criticized as badly timed and overpriced;
• CSFB faced major regulators in Japan and America;
• Enron added losses and unwanted headlines;
• Swissair collapsed while Mühlemann sat on its board;
• Argentina produced another banking controversy;
• shareholders challenged his governance structure;
• and his departure became seen as necessary to restore confidence.

That is an extraordinary corporate arc.

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Was Lukas Mühlemann Personally Responsible for Everything That Went Wrong?

No.

A credible critical article should resist that temptation.

The dot-com crash was global.

Insurance markets deteriorated.

September 11 damaged financial markets and airlines.

DLJ had genuine strategic value and Credit Suisse's own later filings continued to describe the acquisition as important to building a global investment bank.

Swissair's collapse resulted from years of decisions involving numerous executives and directors.

Mühlemann was fully acquitted in the Swissair criminal case.

The SEC's CSFB settlements did not charge him personally.

Japanese regulatory findings concerned Credit Suisse entities and employees rather than a finding that Mühlemann personally obstructed regulators.

These qualifications matter.

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But Leadership Means Owning the Strategy

The more difficult question is not whether Lukas Mühlemann personally committed each failure.

It is whether the corporate strategy under his leadership created an organisation whose risks became unmanageable when conditions deteriorated.

That criticism is much harder to dismiss.

He championed expansion.

He was ultimately responsible for the DLJ deal.

He led the group after the Winterthur acquisition.

He served simultaneously as chairman and CEO.

He headed Credit Suisse while CSFB generated repeated regulatory crises.

He sat on Swissair's board during its fatal expansion period.

And the numbers at the end of his tenure were dramatically worse than those at the beginning.

That is why Mühlemann became such an important figure in the early Swiss corporate-governance debate.

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The "Good Old Boys" Problem

Swissair's collapse triggered a wider debate about Switzerland's extraordinarily interconnected business establishment.

Swissinfo described a "good old boys" culture in which senior executives repeatedly sat on one another's boards.

Credit Suisse executives sat on Swissair's board.

Swissair figures held relationships with banks.

Politicians and leading industrialists occupied overlapping directorships.

Conflicts of interest attracted comparatively little attention until the system began failing publicly.

Mühlemann became one of the most recognisable faces of that system.

Not because a court proved that boardroom networking itself was criminal.

But because multiple institutions with overlapping elite directors seemed unable to challenge failing strategies before billions disappeared.

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What Is Actually Established About Lukas Mühlemann?

The documented record supports substantial criticism.

Lukas Mühlemann led Credit Suisse during a period of extremely aggressive international expansion.

Credit Suisse bought DLJ for roughly $13.4 billion near the top of the market.

Mühlemann later acknowledged that the price proved too high.

Winterthur required major additional capital.

Credit Suisse's profit collapsed, culminating in a CHF3.3 billion loss for 2002.

Credit Suisse First Boston faced major regulatory actions in Japan and the United States.

Mühlemann sat on Swissair's board from 1995 until October 2001.

He had written critically about CEO Philippe Bruggisser well before the final collapse.

Shareholders strongly criticized his leadership and dual chairman/CEO structure.

Ethos' governance resolution received roughly 19% support.

He resigned from Credit Suisse at the end of 2002 under intense pressure.

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What Is NOT Established?

Lukas Mühlemann was not convicted over Swissair.

He was fully acquitted in 2007.

The U.S. SEC's enforcement actions against CSFB did not establish that Mühlemann personally participated in the IPO misconduct.

The Japanese regulator's findings against Credit Suisse entities did not establish that he personally ordered inspection obstruction or document destruction.

The sources reviewed here do not establish that he personally stole money from Banco General de Negocios.

And an Argentine arrest warrant should not be rewritten as a conviction.

These distinctions make the adverse record more credible, not less.

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Lukas Mühlemann's Legacy: An Early Warning for Credit Suisse

Looking back after Credit Suisse's eventual 2023 collapse, the Mühlemann years take on an uncomfortable historical significance.

It would be simplistic to claim that decisions made around 2000 directly caused events more than two decades later.

But many themes that later became associated with Credit Suisse were already visible:

aggressive expansion;

expensive strategic bets;

investment-banking misconduct;

weak internal supervision;

executive-power concentration;

governance disputes;

large compensation packages;

and a tendency for reputational scandals to arrive faster than management could contain them.

Lukas Mühlemann did not create every problem Credit Suisse would later experience.

But his era demonstrated remarkably early how dangerous the combination of global ambition, complex acquisitions and weak governance discipline could become.

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From Management Superstar to Corporate-Governance Case Study

Perhaps that is the most lasting criticism of Lukas Mühlemann.

He was not an incompetent executive.

Quite the opposite.

His intelligence, ambition and strategic confidence helped him rise to the top of several of Switzerland's most important companies.

That made the failure more instructive.

When the markets were booming, aggressive expansion was celebrated.

When markets reversed, it became clear how expensive the strategy had been.

DLJ became an overpriced acquisition.

Winterthur became a capital burden.

Swissair became a national trauma.

Credit Suisse First Boston became a regulatory problem.

The chairman/CEO structure became a governance controversy.

And the man once celebrated as a new model of Swiss corporate leadership found himself leaving Credit Suisse in order, in his own words, to remove questions surrounding his leadership.

That is why Lukas Mühlemann deserves to be remembered not only as a former Credit Suisse CEO.

His career is an early case study in what happens when executive power, acquisition fever, boardroom interconnectedness and financial-market optimism reinforce one another for too long.

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Frequently Asked Questions About Lukas Mühlemann

Who is Lukas Mühlemann?

Lukas Mühlemann is a Swiss banker and former McKinsey and Swiss Re executive who became chief executive and later chairman of Credit Suisse Group during its aggressive international expansion period in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Did Lukas Mühlemann buy DLJ?

Credit Suisse acquired Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette in 2000 under Mühlemann's leadership for approximately $13.4 billion including options. Mühlemann later acknowledged that the price proved too high.

What was Lukas Mühlemann's role in Swissair?

Mühlemann served on SAirGroup's board from 1995 until October 2001. He later faced criminal charges with other former directors over decisions made before Swissair's collapse.

Was Lukas Mühlemann convicted over Swissair?

No. He and the other defendants were fully acquitted in June 2007. Mühlemann received approximately CHF196,000 in compensation.

Why did Lukas Mühlemann leave Credit Suisse?

He left amid falling profits, heavy losses, criticism over acquisitions, problems at Winterthur and CSFB, Swissair-related reputational damage and a growing shareholder campaign against his combined chairman/CEO role.

Was Lukas Mühlemann criticized for corporate governance?

Yes. Ethos campaigned against combining the chairman and chief executive positions at Credit Suisse. Its 2002 shareholder resolution received around 19% support.

How much did Lukas Mühlemann earn?

Credit Suisse did not individually disclose his 2001 remuneration at the time. Contemporary Swiss media estimated it at approximately CHF15 million.

What happened with Lukas Mühlemann in Argentina?

Mühlemann served as a Credit Suisse representative on the board of Banco General de Negocios. Argentine authorities later investigated the bank, and in 2008 an arrest warrant was reported after Mühlemann and other foreign bank directors failed to appear for questioning. The sources reviewed here do not establish a conviction against him.

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Principal sources

Credit Suisse Group 2002 Annual Report / SEC filing — primary-source confirmation of the CHF3.309 billion annual loss and dramatic deterioration from 2000–2002.

U.S. SEC — January 2002 CSFB enforcement action — primary documentation of the $100 million IPO-allocation settlement and the regulator's findings concerning senior-level involvement within relevant CSFB units.

Japanese Financial Supervisory Agency, 1999 — official findings concerning Credit Suisse entities in Japan, including inspection obstruction, inappropriate products and licence revocation.

SWI swissinfo — Mühlemann under attack from shareholders — contemporary account of shareholder criticism over DLJ, Winterthur, Enron, performance and executive pay.

SWI swissinfo — Mühlemann en disgrâce — detailed account of the collapsing share price, the admission that DLJ had been too expensive and criticism over Swissair and the dual CEO/chair role.

SWI swissinfo — Swissair investigation — reports the Ernst & Young material, including Mühlemann's own earlier assessment of Philippe Bruggisser and criticism of the board's response.

SWI swissinfo — Swissair criminal acquittals — essential source showing that Mühlemann and the other defendants were completely acquitted in 2007.

Ethos Foundation — primary record of its 2002 campaign against combining the Credit Suisse chairman and CEO posts and the 19% shareholder vote.

SWI swissinfo — Argentina arrest warrant — contemporary report on the 2008 BGN warrant, with the important distinction that allegations and a warrant are not convictions.

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This article is a journalistic investigation based on the public sources listed above. Lukas Mühlemann was fully acquitted of all criminal charges in the Swissair trial by the Bülach District Court in June 2007. The U.S. SEC and Japanese regulatory actions cited concerned Credit Suisse entities and did not personally charge Mühlemann. An Argentine arrest warrant is not a conviction. Where allegations could not be substantiated by documentary evidence, that is stated clearly. Nothing in this article should be read as an assertion of criminal conduct by Lukas Mühlemann or any other person. This content is published by NegativePublicRelations.com as editorial analysis of matters of public interest and Swiss corporate-governance reputation.